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This paper investigates the effects of information feedback mechanisms on electricity and heating usage
at a student hall of residence in London. In a randomised control trial, we formulate different treatments
such as feedback information and norms, as well as prize competition among subjects. We show that
information and norms lead to a sharp – more than 20% - reduction in overall energy consumption.
Because participants do not pay for their energy consumption this response cannot be driven by cost
saving incentives. Interestingly, when combining feedback and norms with a prize competition for
achieving low energy consumption, the reduction effect – while present initially – disappears in the long
run. This could suggest that external rewards reduce and even destroy intrinsic motivation to change
behaviour.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Reducing overall energy consumption, as well as managing
energy market volatility and demand peaks are increasingly im-
portant issues with the growing focus on decreasing greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions and controlling climate change. Internet
connectivity and electronic innovations now allow energy provi-
ders to develop demand side management systems instead of only
concentrating on supply side management. Using combinations of
information feedback loops and grid management techniques,
operators have the potential to improve the management ofr Ltd. This is an open access article
guc),
al.ac.uk (M. Muûls),energy market volatility and demand peaks. This would lead to
lower energy production costs and reduced emissions. As one
third of all greenhouse gas emissions come from residential en-
ergy consumption (EPA, 2015), understanding how social dy-
namics can impact household energy demand is an important step
in this direction.
In this paper, we investigate the effects feedback information
and norms, as well as prize competition, on energy consumption.
We conduct a randomised control trial for a cohort of price-in-
different individuals at a student hall of residence in London. Our
systematic literature review indicates that we are the ﬁrst to test
such a combination in this particular setting. We provide our
subjects with individual as well as group/comparative feedback. A
crucial factor of our design is that, because participants do not pay
for their energy consumption, the information effect is not con-
founded by any cost saving incentives. This allows us to solely
focus on the effects of behavioural interventions and norms asunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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that information mechanisms are strong: providing individuals
with weekly feedback about their own consumption and their
consumption relative to others leads to a 22% reduction in energy
consumption on average. For a subset of our trial participants we
combine the information treatment with a prize treatment; this
group was promised a prize for the participant with the lowest
energy consumption. This reveals an intriguing perverse effect.
Whereas, for individuals with pure information treatment, the
consumption effect is sustained throughout the trial, for the prize
treated group the effect wears off completely after two weeks of
treatment. We provide some evidence suggesting that this drop-
ping off is caused by a reversal of efforts by individuals who realise
that the prize is out of their reach as a consequence of the in-
formation treatment. This hints at a fundamentally different re-
sponse mechanism when providing a prize: by strengthening ex-
ternal ﬁnancial incentives, internal incentives such as the desire to
reduce consumption because of detrimental social effects – e.g.
through pollution – are weakened.
The focus of this paper is on household energy consumption, a
key sector when considering energy efﬁciency and GHG emissions
reductions. For example, in the UK, the domestic sector accounted
for 27% of overall energy consumption in 20141 (DECC, 2015a) and
14% of total UK carbon emissions in 2013 (DECC, 2015b). These
ﬁgures are expected to increase even further due to population
growth and highlight the sector's growing importance. Statistics
from the US and Western Europe reveal similar trends (Abrahamse
et al., 2005; Gardner and Stern, 2002). In this context, as McMi-
chael and Shipworth (2013) state: “various institutions are trying
to encourage the adoption of behavioural energy-efﬁciency in-
novations through policy, building regulations and other measures
such as direct engagement with communities and constituents”.2
Our research relates to a vast literature analysing the factors
that affect energy use in the residential domain. As described in
Costa and Kahn (2013), household electricity consumption de-
pends on individual choices and house characteristics, appliances
and the intensity of their utilisation which are linked to the local
climate, prices as well as the consumer's personal attributes and
behaviour. At the macro level, factors including technological de-
velopments, demographic factors, household income and eco-
nomic growth are also likely to affect consumption outcomes
(Abrahamse et al., 2005). Additionally, Hori et al. (2013) show that
regulation aimed at reducing energy use is much more effective in
the industrial than in the residential sector. These results indicate
the need to discover mechanisms that effectively induce lower
energy consumption at the household level.
This paper also relates in particular to the literature on the
behavioural dimension of energy use. As reviewed by Lopes et al.
(2012), this subject pertains not only to economics but also to
psychology (Biel and Thøgersen, 2007; Frederiks et al., 2015). From
an economics point of view, the base assumption will be that in-
dividuals are taking rational decisions when deciding on their
energy use (Breukers et al., 2011; Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007).
However, energy and electricity are not typical consumer pro-
ducts. These are rather an abstract, invisible, intangible and in-
direct by-product of other economic choices (Fischer, 2008). For
example, Kempton and Layne (1994) compared energy consump-
tion to shopping without price tags given that the customer only
gets a quarterly bill.
Given these aforementioned characteristics, previous studies
have examined dynamic pricing of electricity and shown that it1 Energy consumption by the domestic sector was 38,162 thousand tonnes of
oil equivalent (DEC, 2015a).
2 p.1 McMichael and Shipworth (2013)effectively switches consumption from peak hours to non-peak
hours during which it's priced lower (for a comprehensive review
see Faruqui and Sergici (2014)). Despite these results, it has been
demonstrated that decreasing overall energy consumption only
through dynamic pricing is challenging (Faruqui and George,
2005; Faruqui et al., 2010). While some studies show a ‘short-term
effect of ﬁnancial rewards’ (Abrahamse et al., 2005), others con-
clude that effects of ﬁnancial rewards for energy conservation are
large and persistent over time (Dolan and Metcalfe, 2015). Ad-
ditionally, policy makers are often wary of using imperfectly de-
signed ﬁnancial incentives that can distort behaviour and lead to
undesired consequences for ﬁnancially constrained portions of the
population or the elderly, for example, by increasing health risks
associated with reduced heat consumption (Barnicoat and Danson,
2015). As Buchanan et al. (2015) state, households already suffer-
ing from fuel poverty have little capacity to further reduce their
energy consumption. Finally, the cost dimension of the energy
savings also relates to rebound effect (Khazzoom, 1980; Saunders,
1992), i.e. households saving money from consuming less energy
may spend their additional income on activities that can generate
more emissions.
As an alternative to ﬁnancial incentives, existing research has
also analysed the importance of information, or feedback me-
chanisms, and their impact on energy use. Feedback entails pro-
viding information to households about their energy consumption
or savings, and is a strategy often employed by energy conserva-
tion initiatives. The effectiveness of different types, frequencies,
duration of feedback on reducing energy use differs at the group,
or even individual level (Abrahamse et al., 2005). One possible
channel for a potential effect of feedback mechanisms could be
that they “rematerialize” energy consumption (e.g. Buchanan et al.,
2014).
Norms have been conjectured to be another meaningful
channel through which information and feedback will impact
energy consumption. They can be descriptive or injunctive; the
former simply inform about others’ performance while the latter
directly suggest what should be done. Feedback that is augmented
with a norm, i.e. direct comparison with ‘average’ or ‘normal’ be-
haviour may prove more powerful. Thaler and Sunstein (2008)
consider that this feedback bypasses the consumer's decision-
making process and acts as a heuristic shortcut or “nudge”. Ad-
ditionally, Fuster and Meier (2010) suggest that ﬁnancial in-
centives could be effective if they manage to change the social
norm. The literature on the effectiveness of norms is rather in-
conclusive. Fischer (2008) reviews studies from 1987 to 2006 and
ﬁnds that norms may not be an important element of feedback, as
they do not affect consumption. More recent studies show on the
contrary that norms do have a measureable impact on household
consumption but some also argue that they can cause a boomer-
ang effect3 (see for example Ayres et al. (2013), Nolan et al. (2008)
or Schulz et al. (2007)). However, Harries et al. (2013) recently
address a limitation of these studies: one should differentiate
between the impact of pure feedback and that of norms. They ﬁnd
that the effect of norms is not statistically signiﬁcant. Allcott and
Rogers (2014) report how a utility company in the USA called
OPOWER mailed home energy use reports, including social com-
parisons, to a selection of its customers. They ﬁnd that it leads to
energy consumption reduction, but that the frequency of the re-
ports affects the persistence of their effect. Others demonstrate
that social interaction and norms play a role in inducing energy
saving behaviours at a decreasing rate over time (Dolan and
Metcalfe, 2015; Hori et al., 2013). Additionally, post-consumption3 Informing low energy consumers about the group norm may inadvertently
inspire them to increase their energy consumption.
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ﬁnancial incentives (Abrahamse et al., 2005).
Given descriptive norms inform the consumer about how she is
performing relative to her pairs, its driving force may be compe-
titive behaviour against peers. Psychologists have long debated the
role of competition in human behaviour (Deci et al., 1981; Deci and
Ryan, 1985; Kohn, 1986). In economics, rational choice theory
takes humans’ competitive spirit for granted. In this paper, we
distinguish competition from descriptive norms. Whilst the lit-
erature cited above has in some cases used the word ‘competition’
instead of ‘descriptive norms’, we instead use the former to de-
scribe prize competition - the case of people entering a competi-
tion to win a prize. The literature on the effect of prize competition
on energy saving behaviour in particular is rather limited. How-
ever, previous evidence in psychology suggests that tangible ex-
trinsic rewards as well as competition can become demotivating as
they undermine intrinsic motivation4 (Deci, 1971; Deci et al., 1981;
Deci et al., 1999; Lepper et al., 1973; Reeve and Deci, 1996; Ryan
and Deci, 2000;).
Our research bridges the areas exploring norms, competition
over energy levels, ﬁnancial rewards and reward competition. In
our experiment, we rely particularly on descriptive norms to
nudge our participants but also use some injunctive norms. We are
particularly interested in the effect of norms when they are free
from price effects, as well as of competition for a prize. We hy-
pothesise that norms are likely to manifest themselves as intrinsic
motivation such as a willingness to preserve the environment out
of own enjoyment. Whereas a prize competition, i.e. a type of ﬁ-
nancial incentive, adds an extrinsic reward dimension to the en-
ergy saving decision, thereby diminishing the norms’ effect.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section
will give a brief introduction to the theoretical model and ex-
perimental hypothesis, while Section 3 will present the metho-
dology used in this study. Section 4 will elaborate on results as
well as provide a short discussion of results, and ﬁnally Section 5
will conclude and discuss further possible research.2. Theoretical framework
In this section, we present the framework used in the design
and analysis of the RCT when considering how individuals choose
their energy consumption. Whilst different methodologies are
utilised in the literature (Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007), we take
the economics approach as a starting point assuming that in-
dividuals make rational choices to maximise their satisfaction, also
called ‘utility’, given their budget constraints.5 However, our
model conjectures that energy consumption decisions are not
purely a rational choice,6 and therefore include the effect of norms
in this context. We build on existing literature showing that in-
dividuals care about norms (see for example Akerlof, 1982; Arrow
et al., 2004; Ball et al., 2001; Bault et al., 2008; Bénabou and Tirole
2011; Dolan and Metcalfe 2015; Jones 1984; Luttmer 2005; Okuno-
Fujiwara and Postlewaite 1995) and assume that the individual's
utility could be decreased by deviating from the norm. Moreover,
given the participants in our trial do not pay for their energy
consumption we diverge from the existing literature by also in-
cluding in our model the possibility for a price-indifferent4 Intrinsic motivation is deﬁned as the doing of an activity for its inherent
satisfactions rather than some separable consequence (Deci and Ryan 1985)
5 A utility framework in this context stems from rational choice theory and
allows us to provide a measure of satisfaction and individual preferences over the
consumption of a good (Read, 2004), in our context, energy.
6 Hence, individuals do not only consider selﬁshly driven consumption
decisions.individual to prioritise norm deviation over price-related matters.
Our model therefore focuses on energy consumption decisions
by representing a typical individual as consumer i who maximises
in period tan objective function that looks as follows
( ) ( ) ( )ν= − − − × − ̅ ( )−u E r b E r w e c n e e, 1it it it it it it t 1
where her utility is a function u of two components, Eit and rit . Eit
represents the energy services enjoyed by individual i at time t:
rather than beneﬁting from the energy consumption itself, in-
dividuals will derive satisfaction from the services it provides such
as light, heat or powering of appliances. The second item, rit , re-
presents research on energy saving options, through which the
individual can learn how to improve her efﬁciency. A consumer
can improve her efﬁciency by engaging in research rit on energy
saving options, which leads to cost of r wit .
The function ( )b Eit measures the beneﬁt, or satisfaction, derived
from energy services. We assume it is a concave function,7 so that
it exhibits decreasing returns: for example, the beneﬁt derived
from boiling water for my ﬁrst cup of coffee in the morning will be
larger than for the third.
Actual energy used is denoted by eit . We assume that:
σ
=
( )
e
E
2it
it
it
where σit measures how efﬁciently a consumer is using energy. The
more efﬁcient a consumer is the less actual energy eit is required to
achieve a given energy service level Eit . In our example, a more efﬁ-
cient kettle will mean a larger σit and hence a smaller quantity of
energy used to produce the same energy service that is a cup of
boiling water.
We denote by c a consumer's unit energy cost, so that total
energy expenditure is e cit . We assume that the individual's utility
is decreased by this expenditure.
If a consumer cares about how she performs relative to others -
i.e. she is susceptible to norms – then ν > 0 and the convex
function ( )− ̅ −n e eit t 1 enters her utility function. We have ̅ −et 1 de-
noting the energy consumption of the most efﬁcient peer-group
consumers in the previous period. If the individual i is lagging
behind, i.e. she is consuming more energy than her most efﬁcient
peers, then ( )− ̅ −e eit t 1 will be positive. Her utility will be
decreased.
This lag relative to the efﬁcient consumers is also likely to affect
the productivity of the individual's energy consumption. For sim-
plicity we assume that
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )σ σ= − ̅ ( )− −r e eexp 3it BAUi it it t1 1
which suggests that a consumer can improve her efﬁciency σit
relatively to a Business-as-usual (BAU) level σBAUi. If she is lagging
behind, such that ( )− ̅ −e eit t 1 is positive, it means that there exists
ways for her to reduce this lag and consume a quantity of energy
that is closer to her most efﬁcient peers. If she is aware that she is
lagging behind, her search rit for energy efﬁciency is more effective
if this consumer has a larger amount of catching up to do. If the
consumer does no research, or if she is already among the most efﬁ-
cient, the expression in parenthesis in Eq. (3) will be equal to zero, and
her efﬁciency σit will remain at the level σBAUi with no improvement.
The key parameter of interest for the purposes of this paper is
ν. Consider the hypothesis that ν = 0; i.e. consumers are in-
different to descriptive norms. In that case, the last term of Eq. (1)
is dropped. The level of energy service demanded by the consumer
would then be determined by maximising utility both with respect
to energy services, obtaining the following ﬁrst order condition7 E.g. consider ( )= × −b E B E Eit it it2
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σ
∂
∂
=
( )
b E
E
c
4
it
it it
as well as with respect to research effort, for which the ﬁrst order
condition is
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦σ − ̅ = ( )− −c
E
e e w
5
it
it
it t1 1
Combining Eqs. (2) and (5) we ﬁnd that
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦σ= = − ̅ ( )− −
e
E w
c e e 6
it
it
it it t1 1
This equation indicates that the less costly it is to search for
energy efﬁciency improving opportunities (the smaller w), the
higher the energy cost c, and the larger the gap to the most efﬁ-
cient consumer, the lower energy consumption eit will be today.
The important takeaway from this is that even if the consumer
does not care about norms, her consumption will still be inﬂu-
enced by the consumption level of her peers: a large gap between
her and her efﬁcient peers means there are more learning op-
portunities to improve.
Note that if the marginal cost of energy is zero – =c 0 – then the
ﬁrst order condition for energy services derived in Eq. (4) becomes
( )∂
∂
=
( )
b E
E
0
7
it
it
As =c 0, improving her energy efﬁciency will not yield any
reduction in cost: the marginal beneﬁt from research is always
smaller than its marginal cost. As a consequence, consumers
would not undertake any research on energy saving options and
consequently σ σ=it BAUi would be unaffected by the performance of
the most efﬁcient consumers, ̅ −et 1. This means that if =c 0 and we
nevertheless observe that consumers are responsive to informa-
tion about peer energy consumption, it must be the case that
ν > 0.
In the RCT conducted in this paper, the trial group is provided
with information about ̅et , the control group is not, and marginal
energy costs are zero for all. The regressions we report below can
then be interpreted as a test of the hypothesis ν = 0. If the hy-
pothesis is true, we would not expect to ﬁnd any effect of the
treatment.3. Methods
This study was implemented in a student residence in West
London (UK) in the summer of 2013. At the time, 466 postgraduate
students8 lived there, and had moved into their studio ﬂats in
October 2012. Each studio in this residence is occupied by one to
two residents and is approximately the same size (varying be-
tween 18 m2 and 22 m2). Electricity and hot water for heating
consumption are collected for each studio by Schneider Electric
meters whose data-readings are stored on a server. This data was
collated in weekly increments by Powerlogic ION Enterprise soft-
ware that produces csv ﬁles with this information.
Prior to the ﬁeld experiment, a survey to collect demographic
and socio-economic characteristics of participants (see Appendix
A) was distributed to all 466 residents. The main areas of the
survey include: demographic information, experience with past
energy usage and perceptions regarding energy use and the im-
portance of conserving energy. A total of 89 respondents com-
pleted the questionnaire at least in part, implying a response rate8 This was the whole population of the halls of residence to whom the survey
was sentof 19.3%.
The survey methodology consisted of sending out (i) an in-
troductory letter, (ii) the questionnaire followed by a (iii) thank
you/reminder. Moreover, an additional questionnaire was sent to
non-respondents in order to collect more responses. At the be-
ginning of the survey (see Appendix A), each participant was
provided with information including the nature and purpose of
our research, their role in the study, and a guarantee of con-
ﬁdentiality. The participants were then requested to acknowledge
understanding and consent to the use of the subsequent data in
order to continue with the survey. This permission was then fur-
ther used to include consenting participants in the experimental
RCT study. Each participant was provided the option to receive
further information about the study or to withdraw from the study
at any time, without penalty or loss. The online survey was de-
signed and distributed electronically using Qualtrics software. A
reminder was also sent before the survey closed. To incentivise
completion of the survey, we promised and then offered a d50
Amazon voucher to a randomly selected participant.
In an attempt to monitor social dynamics within groups, re-
spondents were asked to report the number of residents they were
familiar with or interacted with on a regular basis. Approximately
50% of the sample reported regular interactions with only ﬁve
individuals or less within the student residence; therefore, we do
not suspect a strong communication bias among participants. The
89 residents that responded to the survey constitute the sample
population for our randomised control trial. This was because the
survey included a question about consent to using their energy
consumption data for research. For these students, we inspected
energy consumption data from the beginning of June (Monday the
3rd of June 2013) for 10 weeks. A ﬁrst intervention report was
distributed to participants at the beginning of week 5 (on Monday
the 1st of July), and was sent out every Monday for a further
6 weeks. The energy use data collected for each week was used to
inform the subjects about their own as well as relative energy
consumption via their weekly energy reports.
This weekly energy report, emailed to participants, was de-
veloped based on a number of well known pre-established ones
such as the OPOWER report (Allcott, 2011) and contains two main
sections, namely a social comparison module and an action steps
module (see Fig. 1).
The social (peer-group) comparison module consists of de-
scriptive and injunctive norms. Descriptive norms, the ﬁrst ele-
ment in the social comparison module, are represented as a
comparison of residents’ individual energy use for a week to both
the overall mean use denoted by ‘all neighbours’ and the mean of
the ‘efﬁcient neighbours”, the 20% of participating students using
the least energy. In addition, this element also reports a weekly
rank of the resident in comparison to the 89 participants. Fur-
thermore, the energy use is further broken down into ‘electricity’
and ‘heating’ elements, which are then tracked on a weekly graph.
The second component of the social comparison module is a
series of injunctive norms. The overall weekly comparison is rated
as ‘great’, ‘good’, or ‘more than average’ coupled with appropriate
smiley faces. Within the energy progress, a dashboard indicator
moves between red, orange, light green and dark green status and
a corresponding ﬁgure regarding how much energy has been used
in comparison to the group.
In the second module, the action steps include a series of en-
ergy conservation tips. These tips, differing weekly, are selected
based on relative simplicity and ease of implementation, and do
not require any additional expenditure from the user. This part of
the report is crucial as it helps us deﬁne how inputs (i.e. beha-
viours such as temperature of heating in the home, cooking food,
etc.) translate into output (total resource use in kWh): it allows the
participants to link the information about the norm behaviour in
Fig. 1. Example of the study's weekly home energy report.
Notes: the weekly energy report emailed to participants includes social comparison and action steps modules. The social comparison module consists of (i) a comparison of
residents’ individual energy use for a week to both the overall mean use denoted by ‘all neighbours’ and the mean of the ‘efﬁcient neighbours”, the 20% of participating students
using the least energy, (ii) a weekly rank of the resident, (iii) electricity as well as heating consumption, (iv) the overall weekly comparison rated as ‘great’, ‘good’, or ‘more than
average’ coupled with appropriate smiley faces, and (v) a dashboard indicator. The action steps module includes a series of energy conservation tips, differing weekly.
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The randomised control trial was based on three experimental
groups, namely the control group (1) and two treatment groups (2
and 3):
 Group 1 – Control: Received a single e-mail at the start of the
experiment that contained a series of simple energy saving tips.
 Group 2 – ‘Information, feedback and norms’ treatment: Re-
ceived the energy weekly report described above.
 Group 3 – ‘Information, feedback, norms and prize competition’
treatment: Received the same energy weekly report as G2
participants. They were additionally informed that a competi-
tion was running to ﬁnd the resident with the lowest energy
consumption over the course of the project, although, no spe-
ciﬁc prize was communicated.
Finally, in order to gather ﬁrst-hand information regarding parti-
cipants’ thoughts, feelings and reactions to the study, we conducted a9 Also noted by Dolan and Metcalfe (2015) about various similar studies, “what
is missing here, is the ability of the person to understand how to transform that
norm into observable behaviour change. Therefore the norm has to be accom-
panied by the information to actually change behaviour”.small-scale feedback review from participants. Its main goal was to
collect information on what participants thought worked well or was
irrelevant, whether they were able to understand the weekly report
and their preferred method or frequency of communication. The
questions were posed as a combination of structured and open-ended
form, in order to encourage honest and detailed feedback and were
distributed via a bulk email a week after our experiment concluded.
The beneﬁts of this setting for our RCT are emphasised given the ex-
isting literature on energy consumption decisions. These decisions are
complex for households (Lutzenhiser, 1992) and isolating factors in a
ﬁeld experiment can be difﬁcult. However, we are in a relatively easier
position to isolate particular aspects of decision-making: participating
students have identical rooms, use identical appliances (fridge, cooker,
heating) and similar income status. Of course, the generalisability of
results from experiments with student subjects has long been de-
bated; for example, Druckman and Kam (2011) show that in fact
student samples are comparable to general population. In our study,
their student status makes them easily comparable and allows us to
control aspects that we could not have done with a wider population.
To measure and establish the impact of our treatments from
the experimental part of the study we implement a simple dif-
ference in difference (DID) speciﬁcation; i.e. we run regressions of
the following generic form:
Table 1
Survey results for demographic variables.
Gender Male Female
45% 55%
Nationality UK Rest of Europe Asia Other
19% 31% 33% 17%
Previous
residence
UK Rest of Europe Asia Other
44% 22% 16% 19%
Previous
living
With
family
With others (non-
family)
Alone
48% 33% 19%
Annual Bud-
get (d)
Above
40,000
30,000–39,999 20,000–
29,000
10,000–
19,000
Below
10,000
7% 2% 17% 41% 33%
Funding
source
Self-
funded
Scholarship Students
loans
Other
48% 21% 7% 24%
Parental
education
Doctoral
degree
Masters
degree
College /some
college
High
school or
less
24% 31% 41% 4%
Notes: 89 participants completed the questionnaire at least in part and hence was
included in our RCT. The above results are based on the answers of 42 participants
whom have fully completed the survey.
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X 8
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where ΔeWi is the percentage change in weekly energy consumption
for student i relative to a pre-intervention base week, which is week
4 in our results below. We compute percentage changes as
Δ ̃ = −
×( + ) ( )
e
e e
e e0. 5 9W
w
w
4
4
i.e. the change in consumption relative to the average consumption in
week w and week 4. This allows us to compute Δ ̃eW even if con-
sumption is 0 in either week w or week 4, which is relevant for heat
consumption, where most students had weeks without using heating.
Treatedi is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for students
that received one of our interventions. If β2, the parameter asso-
ciated with this indicator is not signiﬁcantly different from zero,
then we can conclude that the treatment and control group are
comparable before treatment. PostTreatW indicates weeks during
which the treatment is active. The main parameter of interest is β1
which given the random assignment of treatment gives us an es-
timate of the average causal impact of the treatment. Because we
use percentage changes as the dependent variable the parameter
estimate for β1 can be interpreted as the percentage reduction
energy consumption due to the treatment. XWt is a vector of ad-
ditional control variables such as nationality or gender of the
student. However, note that given the random assignment of
treatment it is not necessary to include additional control variables
to get unbiased estimates of β1.
104. Results and discussion
4.1. Survey results
Our main goal in conducting this survey in the ﬁrst stage of our
study was to gain further information into the characteristics of
the residents taking part in the study, in particular in relation to
their energy use. The descriptive statistics for the results of our
questionnaire are shown below. A summary and the summary of
descriptive statistics of all the relevant variables can be found in
Appendix C.
4.1.1. Demographic variables
The demographic variables include gender, nationality, income/
budget, parental education level and previous residential status.
Appendix C shows that the three treatment groups are comparable
in terms of those observables as could be expected from the ran-
dom treatment of the students.
Table 1 shows an almost equal split between male and female
and the budget level of the respondents is predominantly between
d10,000 and d19,000 per annum (41% of respondents). We also
observe a very high level of parental education amongst re-
spondents, with 96% having attained some college or higher high
school and a further 55% having a graduate degree. This is well
above the UK national average – which approximates 79% of adults
having completed an upper secondary education (Eurostat, 2013).
4.1.2. Historical energy use
We ﬁnd that for a large proportion of our student sample, the
energy bill at their previous place of residence was either paid for
by their parents (38%) or by someone else (2%). Others had10 Our main results below do not include further controls but we examined the
robustness of our results to including such controls and can make them available
on request.experienced a ﬂat rate (26%) or the payment was included in the
rent (22%). Hence, we conclude that a maximum of 12% of parti-
cipants have experience of paying for their energy bills and have
some awareness about the cost of energy.
4.1.3. Energy related intent and perceptions
In the residence, ﬂats are supplied with basic appliances,
namely, a microwave oven, refrigerator and thermostat. To fully
understand the students’ means to reduce energy consumption,
we collected information on appliances used in the ﬂats, such as
laptops.11 We also asked our subjects whether they felt if they
knew how to save energy. A large majority (90%) thought they
were aware of necessary measures. We nevertheless included
saving tips in the feedback report of our study such as to ensure
that 100% of participants understood how to link the change in
their behaviour regarding their energy consumption into energy
saving output. Literature shows that technology or intervention
acceptance increases with perceived usefulness (Davis et al., 1989;
Szajna, 1996). The students were also well aware of their daily
energy use pattern, with 83% suggesting they used the most en-
ergy in the evening.
In order to gauge the perception of our subjects about their
own behaviour, we posed some questions about their energy
saving habits. We ﬁnd that lifestyle and comfort take precedence
over energy saving with respect to laptop use, as 26% of re-
spondents will always leave it on and 33% only ‘when working on
something important’. However, we still observe a large positive
response (95% of participants) towards the importance of energy
saving, with some 83% of participants declaring they always switch
the lights off when leaving a room.
Despite not paying for their energy bills, respondents were
asked to rank the reasons for which they would consider energy
saving as important. The resulting order was (1) saving money –
50% (2) energy security – 43% (3) climate change – 36%. This result
is interesting given that the RCT's setting means monetary11 Typical energy usage for these appliances is given in Table C2, Appendix C.
Fig. 2. The effect of information treatment on changes in energy consumption.
Notes: the ﬁgure shows the average change (separately for all analysed weeks)
relative to the last pre-treatment week (week 4) in energy consumption for both
the treatment group (i.e. those students that received energy consumption feed-
back) and the control group that received no feedback for every analysed week.
Table 3
Basic DD estimation.
Percentage change in
Dependent variables (1) Total
energy
(2) Electricity (3) Heat
Treated 0.009 0.067 0.178
(0.081) (0.079) (0.114)
Treatment Period 0.198** 0.062 0.488***
(0.091) (0.073) (0.131)
Treated X Treatment
Period
0.215** 0.077 0.469***
(0.106) (0.084) (0.173)
Observations 890 890 890
Number of rooms 89 89 89
R-squared 0.127 0.034 0.192
Notes: Dependent variables are computed as percentage changes relative to the last
pre treatment week; i.e. −
× ( + )
ew e
ew e
4
0.5 4
where eW denotes energy consumption in
week w. Robust standard errors. Clusters at the level of individual rooms.
**¼signiﬁcant at 5%, ***¼signiﬁcant at 1%
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the population in our survey is not primarily environmentally
driven, as could have been the case in a student hall.
4.2. Randomised control trial
This section reports the RCT results using a difference-in-dif-
ference approach as described in Eq. (8) of Section 3.
4.2.1. Basic Results
A ﬁrst analysis of the RCT results shows in Fig. 2 that there is an
aggregate effect of the intervention on energy consumption, with
groups 2 and 3 combined as the “treated”. We ﬁnd that as a result
of the intervention, the treated groups showed a drop in con-
sumption after treatment begins in week 5, whereas before the
treatment in weeks 1–4 they follow similar trends on average. In
Table 2, we conﬁrm that before the treatment both average energy
consumption and the average growth in energy consumption are
statistically indistinguishable before treatment begins between
treatment and control groups (rows 1 and 2 of Table 2), which is toTable 2
Descriptive statistics.
Total energy consumption pre
treatment in kW h
Average Average growth
Treatment groups Control 24.509 0.046
All Treated 27.679 0.053
Information 29.367 0.031
Competition 25.992 0.076
Position relative to
peers
Marginal 40.281 0.038
Non Marginal 21.612*** 0.056
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics on energy consumption for different
subsamples participating in our RCT. Stars indicate if means are signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent between different groups. ***¼signiﬁcant at 1%. In Panel 1 difference test are
relative to control group. In panel 2 (comparing position relative to peers) differ-
ence test is between the marginal and non-marginal group. A marginal group is
deﬁned as a student who is not in the bottom 20 in week 5 and neither in the top
5 in week 6. This deﬁnition is further explained in Section 4.2.3 Incentives and
Learning.be expected given the random assignment of treatment. Average
energy consumption is 25–28 kW h per week for both treated and
control groups. Energy consumption declines on average per week
by 5%. In Table 3, we conﬁrm the impact of treatment by ﬁtting the
regression suggested in Eq. (8). Column 1 reports results for total
energy, column 2 for electricity and column 3 for heat energy
consumption. Across all speciﬁcations the treatment and control
groups follow the same trends, which is reﬂected by the “Treated”
dummy not being statistically signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcients of the
treatment period dummy interacted with the treated group in-
dicator – “Treated X Treatment Period” – we can interpret as the
percentage causal impact of treatment; i.e. the treatment reduces
the (total) energy consumption of the treated by approximately
22% on average. The treatment effect seems to arise primarily from
reductions in heating energy consumption. This might be due to
the fact that the RCT being conducted in summer means that
heating is less of a necessity and its demand is more elastic. Note
that the majority of students participating in the trial (68%) have
been using their heating during the trial period.
4.2.2. Information versus Competition
Within our treatment group of 60 residents we administered
two different kinds of treatment: pure norm only, which we refer
to as ‘information’ in the tables and ﬁgures, or the same norm but
combined with prize competition, which we refer to as ‘compe-
tition’. Fig. 3 looks at these two groups separately. This reveals an
interesting pattern. Initially, in weeks 5 and 6, both treatment
groups behave very similarly, by reducing their energy consump-
tion once exposed to treatment. However, starting in week 7, the
competition group starts to fall back so that the average growth in
energy consumption resembles more that of the control group.
Indeed, the regression results in the ﬁrst column of Table 4 con-
ﬁrm that in weeks 5 and 6 (Period 1) the energy consumption for
both treatment groups reduces signiﬁcantly by around 20% re-
lative to the control group. However, in treatment period 2 (weeks
7-10), the gap between the competition and the control group is
no longer signiﬁcant and only around 9%. For the information
(norm only) group on the other hand, the reduction gap deepens
to around 30%. Rows 3 and 4 of Table 2 conﬁrm that neither in
terms of levels of energy consumption nor in terms of growth rates
are there signiﬁcant differences between the two different treat-
ment groups and the control group. Non-signiﬁcant differences in
pre-treatment trends are equally conﬁrmed by the non-signiﬁcant
Fig. 3. The effect of information treatment on changes in energy consumption for
different treatment groups.
Notes: the ﬁgure shows the average change (separately for all analysed weeks)
relative to the last pre-treatment week (week 4) in energy consumption separately
for the two treatment groups (i.e. pure information feedback and feedback in
combination with a competition to reduce consumption) and the control group
that received no feedback for every analysed week.
Table 4
DD of the intervention for treatment and control groups – distinguishing between
different treatments.
Dependent Variable Percentage change in Total energy consumption
Information 0.019
(0.086)
Competition 0.038
(0.091)
Treatment period 1 0.128 0.135
(0.087) (0.083)
Treatment period 2 0.234** 0.240**
(0.102) (0.093)
Period 1 X Info 0.190 0.209**
(0.115) (0.102)
Period 1 X Comp 0.250** 0.212*
(0.108) (0.107)
Period 2 X Info 0.289** 0.308**
(0.137) (0.126)
Period 2 X Comp 0.137 0.099
(0.131) (0.133)
Observations 890 890
Rooms 89 89
R-squared 0.144 0.143
Notes: Dependent variables are computed as percentage changes relative to the last
pre treatment week; i.e. −
× ( + )
ew e
ew e
4
0.5 4
where eW denotes energy consumption in
week w. Robust standard errors. Clusters at the level of individual rooms.
*¼signiﬁcant at 10%, **¼signiﬁcant at 5%.
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(row 1 and 2) of Table 4. Given this absence of signiﬁcant pre-
trend differences between the two treatment and the control
groups, we report in column 2 of Table 4 the same regression as in
column 1, but restricting the two treatment group dummies to
zero. This improves the efﬁciency of the regression, and conﬁrms
statistically the differential evolutions of the information and
competition groups in periods 1 and 2 of the treatment weeks.4.2.3. Incentives and learning
The results above raise the question of why the two treatment
groups behave differently after week 6. We explore an explanation
that combines two elements. Firstly, we suggest that treatment
period 1 serves as a learning period. Individuals discover how they
perform relative to others. Secondly, we propose that the beha-
vioural drivers are fundamentally different between the two
treatment groups. The information group is driven by the in-
dividuals’ desire to reduce energy consumption in order to achieve
societal objectives (i.e. preventing emissions and climate change).
However, given the possibility of a ﬁnancial gain is introduced for
the competition group, their behaviour is driven by the in-
dividuals’ efforts to maximise this gain.
Only the student with the lowest energy consumption would
win a prize. Hence, if this becomes the main behavioural driver,
there is little incentive to change behaviour if it seems completely
out of reach to be the best student at reducing energy consump-
tion and winning the prize. From the information and norms
provided during the trial, students were able to assess their
chances of coming ﬁrst. Hence, we might be able to explain the
pattern seen in Fig. 3 by some students initially trying to win the
ﬁnal prize but after week 6 realising that it is out of reach to them,
thereby abandoning their previous efforts. We may call such stu-
dents the marginal group.
To explore this potential explanation, we deﬁne this marginal
group as follows: a student who is not in the bottom 20 in week
5 and neither in the top 5 in week 6. This will therefore include
students who, in the light of week 5 comparison, would have a
chance to win the prize competition – they are not those with the
highest energy consumption, ranked the worst – but who, by week
6, realise they are unlikely to be the winner of the prize –they are
not in the top 5 consuming the least energy.
The precise thresholds are of course arbitrary and we have
explored various alternatives – some reported in the Appendix D –
which show that our main results are robust to variety of different
thresholds. Table 2 (in rows 5 and 6) reports average energy
consumption and growth trends pre treatment for the two groups.
In terms of consumption levels, non-marginals have on average
signiﬁcantly lower energy consumption: 21kWh as opposed to 40.
However, in terms of growth trends – which is what we rely on for
identiﬁcation of effects – they are statistically not distinguishable.
In Fig. 4, we report average trends over our 10-week sample for
these two groups. Consider ﬁrst the top row of the diagrams. They
compare the two treatment groups; i.e. information treatment
only vs. information and competition/prize treatment. We see that
in weeks 5 and 6 the two groups trend similarly. However, in week
7, we observe the opening of a gap for the marginal group: energy
consumption for the information treated students continues to
decline whereas the competition treated students increase their
energy consumption on average. In the non-marginal group no
such gap opens up.
In the ﬁgures in the second row, we compare the competition
treated students with the control group that received no treatment
at all. For the marginal group we see that a gap opens up in weeks
5 and 6 but that the gap becomes smaller after week 6. For the
non-marginal group we do not ﬁnd any such pattern.
In Table 5, we report regressions corresponding to the four
diagrams of Fig. 4. We regress Δ ̃eW on a treatment period 2 dum-
my and on interactions between the period 2 dummy and each
group. In column 1, we only include in the sample the marginal
group and excluding control group students. Hence, the coefﬁ-
cients on the interaction dummies, ‘Competition X Period’ corre-
spond to the average difference in energy growth between the two
treatment groups in each period. As seen visually in Fig. 4, the
average gap is small and indeed negative in period 1 but not sig-
niﬁcant: the average reduction for competition treated students
Fig. 4. Distinguishing between different treatments for the Marginal and Non Marginal group of treated students.
Notes: these ﬁgures report average trends for change in energy consumption over our 10-week sample for marginal and non-marginal groups. Marginal group is deﬁned as
students who are not in the bottom 20 in week 5 and neither in the top 5 in week 6. In the top row, two treatment groups are compared (Information treatment only vs.
information and competition/prize treatment). In second row, the competition treated students are compared to the control group that received no treatment at all.
Table 5
Marginal vs non marginal consumers.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Competition vs Info Competition vs Control
Dependent Variables Marginal Non
marginal
Marginal Non marginal
Treatment Period 2 0.202* 0.218 0.075 0.163
(0.110) (0.261) (0.141) (0.166)
Competition X Period 1 0.004 0.048 0.360*** 0.062
(Mean difference in
Period 1)
(0.098) (0.149) (0.121) (0.180)
Competition X Period 2 0.265** 0.134 0.218 0.094
(Mean difference in
Period 2)
(0.125) (0.346) (0.137) (0.261)
Observations 276 84 240 114
Rooms 46 14 40 19
Rooms in Control Group 0 0 19 10
Rooms in Info Group 25 5 0 0
Rooms in Competition
Group
21 9 21 9
R-squared 0.062 0.022 0.081 0.021
Notes: Dependent variables are computed as percentage changes relative to the last
pre treatment week; i.e. −
× ( + )
ew e
ew e
4
0.5 4
where eW denotes energy consumption in
week w. Robust standard errors. Clusters at the level of individual rooms.
*¼signiﬁcant at 10%, **¼signiﬁcant at 5%, ***¼signiﬁcant at 1%.
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However, in treatment period 2 the average gap becomes a posi-
tive and signiﬁcant 26% points.
In column 2, we restrict the sample to non-marginal students.
In neither period is there a signiﬁcant gap. In column 3, we include
marginal students from treatment group 3 and marginal control
group students. We see that, on average, competition treated
students reduce their energy consumption by a signiﬁcant 36%
points more than students in the control group. However, this gap
reduces to non-signiﬁcant 21.8% points in period 2. Again, we
cannot detect a signiﬁcant gap in the non-marginal group (column
4).
Hence, both the graphical analysis and the regression analysis
suggest that the dropping-off effect identiﬁed in Fig. 2 for the
competition treated group is driven by students in the marginal
group.5. Conclusions and policy implications
Our societies are facing important challenges, such as climate
change, that require a new low carbon energy system. Delivering
such a solution, whilst addressing fuel poverty and ensuring en-
ergy security, raises many issues on different fronts. A smart grid,
integrating network and demand control technologies, will need
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ment will be the improvement of energy efﬁciency. Policies such
as the rollout of smart meters rely on the hypothesis that con-
siderable efﬁciency improvements can be achieved through pro-
viding consumers with more information about both their own
energy consumption as well as that of others. In this paper, we
explore these questions in the unique setting of a student hall with
a large number of identical and smart metered studio ﬂats.
As we described above, various previous studies have estab-
lished that feedback provision can have sustained impact on en-
ergy consumption. The main contribution of this paper is that we
can examine the effects of feedback in a setting where the treated
consumers do not have to pay for the energy they consume. We
ﬁnd a strong and signiﬁcant impact of providing residents with
feedback on both their own consumption and how it stands re-
lative to other consumers: on average total energy consumption
reduces by more than 20% relative to a control group that receives
no information. This suggests that such effects are – at least in part
– driven by intrinsic motivations – e.g. the willingness to reduce
pollution – and the desire to comply with norms rather than by
external rewards from reduced costs. Awareness seems to be key
for energy management even with no speciﬁc price motives, cor-
roborating similar ﬁndings in the literature regarding the use of
social norms.
For a subset of our sample population we combine the feedback
treatment with a prize for the resident with the lowest energy
consumption. Hence, we re-introduce an external reward. Inter-
estingly, for this group we ﬁnd that the treatment effect dissipates
after two weeks. This could imply that external incentives, far
from re-enforcing intrinsic motivation could cancel it out and be
less effective overall. This shows how important the design of such
interventions can be. These results can be useful to energy market
operators who need to carefully plan their approach towards en-
ergy demand management through various instruments such as
the inclusion of norms with prize competition. By understanding
individual characteristics and behavioural responses, they will be
in a better position to estimate the energy elasticity of demand.
This means they can meet their environmental objectives and
target customers in a more efﬁcient way.
The results of this paper are also an interesting contribution to
the existing evidence. Even though the opportunity to track their
energy consumption proved to be valuable to our participants in
reducing their consumption and hence improving energy efﬁ-
ciency, we highlight the delicate relationship between the use of
norms and behavioural change in energy demand. Other studies
have similarly observed that once households realise their energy
saving potential they might become frustrated and demotivated
(Hargreaves et al., 2013). Besides, our RCT design beneﬁted from
and its results reinforce those of existing studies, including high-
lights of the importance of feedback (Allcott and Rogers, 2014) or
the persistence of energy consumption reductions (Dolan and
Metcalfe, 2015).Our study also has a number of limitations. While the context
of a student residence provides for highly comparable treatment
and control units and a well-developed metering infrastructure, it
raises questions regarding external validity. Our prior would be
that ‘real’ households, with a higher and more diverse usage of
energy, also provide more opportunities for saving energy. Indeed,
students in our study are equipped with basic appliances and a
self-adjustable thermostat, such that the variation in their energy
consumption is much more limited than a typical household. We
could expect to ﬁnd stronger effects in a ‘real’ household context.
On the other hand, students provide a sample that is more highly
educated and driven by intrinsic incentives than the rest of the
population, which might imply that effects in such a context
would be more muted. Ultimately, the temporal dimension of the
experiment is ten weeks thus limiting the identiﬁcation of po-
tential seasonality in energy demand elasticity. We are currently
working with several energy retailers and service companies to
conduct similar experiments in other settings, which should pro-
vide clarity on these questions in the near future.
Finally, the ﬁnding of a weaker effect when providing what
appears to be more high-powered incentives, i.e. prize com-
petition, is a surprising and unexpected result that deserves
further attention. Can this effect be replicated in other set-
tings? Is it contingent on providing external rewards via a
competition where the winner takes it all, or would it also
occur with more balanced rewards? These lines of inquiry are
left for further research.
Importantly, our ﬁndings inform policy through the insights
they bring on energy management and efﬁciency. The smart
meter rollout that is being required by EU and UK policy will be
used in the future to give all consumers a real-time feedback
on their energy consumption. Understanding the optimal
amount, content and frequency of information feedback, as
well as its combination with other ﬁnancial incentives and
prizes, is a necessary input in the design of smart meter in-
terfaces that are a key element of the smart grid needed to face
society's challenges. The results of this paper points towards
the fact that incentives, norms and feedback, if used in a well-
thought combination, reduce overall consumption. It is clear
that in the area of residential energy use, implementing system
monitoring and intelligent control require a strong knowledge
of consumer behaviour.Acknowledgements
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A1: Survey questionnaire
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Dear Student,
We would greatly appreciate your input in an academic re-
search study being conducted at the Grantham Institute for Cli-
mate Change and Business School at Imperial College. The main
aim of the study is to understand people’s awareness of energy
consumption in our community. It's a short questionnaire and
for useful results your response is very important.
By ﬁlling in the survey you will be entered in a draw to win a
d50 Amazon voucher*! The deadline for entering the draw has
been extended to the 9th of June at midnight.
Follow this link to the Survey:${l://SurveyLink? d¼Take the Survey}.
Or copy and paste the URL below into your Internet browser:
${l://SurveyURL}.
We very much appreciate your help.
Best regards,
Dr. Mirabelle Muuls.
*Note: The draw for the d50 Amazon voucher will take place on
the 3rd of June and the winner will be notiﬁed by email. The
voucher will be valid for 11 months and redeemable on www.
amazon.co.uk.
Follow the link to opt out of future emails:
${l://OptOutLink? d¼Click here to unsubscribe}.
G. Alberts et al. / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 504–523518Appendix B. Energy consumption communications
B1: Singular energy saving report (control)
12
3
4
5
6
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i)
iiB3: Qualitative feedback communication
Dear Resident,
As you are no doubt aware, you have been receiving a perso-
nalised Home Energy Reports weekly for the past few weeks. This
pilot project has now come to an end and we would like to thank
you for your participation.
We would also like to ask you a few short questions about the
study. Replying should only take a few minutes of your time, and
will be extremely valuable in improving the study going forward:)
) Did you understand the report? Please explain any aspects that
were confusing or conversely that you felt were effective.
) Did you ﬁnd the feedback report valuable?
) Would you like to receive a report like this in future? If so, how
often?
) Were you motivated to decrease your energy consumption
when receiving the report? Why?
) Did the study result in a change in your energy consumption
behaviour? In what way? Please explain any steps or actions
you took that were different after receiving the weekly email.
) Please rank how useful you found the following parts of the
report: (1¼ completely useless; 2¼ useless; 3¼ I’m not sure; 4¼useful; 5¼ very useful)Electricity and heating consumption
graphsii) Energy saving
tipsi) Neighbour's energy consumption iv) Weekly rankii
Please rank your change in the following: (1¼ signiﬁcantly
worse; 2¼ worse; 3¼ no change; 4¼ better; 5¼ signiﬁcantly
better).Knowledge about saving
energyii) Attitude towards saving
energyi) Intention to save energy iv) Ability to save energyIf there is anything else you would like to tell us about, or
feedback on please feel free to do so!.
Thank you again.
Kind regards, ICL Energy Team.
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see: Tables C1 and C2.
A summary of the various descriptive elements of the survey,
including the percentage where relevant, mean score, and stan-
dard deviation for the group in total as well as per experimental
group are found below in Table 1. Despite some variation in de-Table C1
Summary of survey descriptive statistics by total and experimental group.
Variable Coding
Demographic information
V1: Institution 1 Science, technology and medicin
2 Business, economics and ﬁnance
3 Other (humanities, art, law)
V2: Gender 1 Male 2 Female
1 Europe 2 United Kingdom
3 North America 4 Caribbean
V3: Nationality 5 Asia 6 India
7 Middle East 8 Africa
1 Below d10k 2d10k–d19,999
V4: Annual budget 3d20 k–d29,999 4d30 k–d39,999
5 Above d40k
V7: Funding source 1 Self-funded 2 Student loans
3 Scholarship 4 Other
V9: Residence period 1 1 year or less
2 More than 1 year and less than 5
3 More than 5 years
1 By yourself
V10: Living situation 2 With non-family members
3 With parents or family members
V11: Parental education level 1 Less than high school
2 High school / GED
3 Some college
4 College degree
5 Master's degree
6 Doctoral degree
V12: Energy payment method 1 Utility bills included in the rent
2 Individual meter - ﬂat tariff
3 Individual meter with top-up
4 Other payment schemes
5 I did not pay for electricity
6 My parents paid for electricity
Historical energy use
V13: Previous energy cost 1 Cheap 2Fair
3 Expensive 4 I do not know
V14: Avg. energy bill 1d0–d20 2d20–d50
3d50–d100 4d100þ
Energy behaviour and perceptions
V15: Know how to save 1 Yes 2 No
V16: Switch off light 1 Yes 2 No
V18: Turn off appliances 1 Always - 5 Never
V19: Leave PC on standby 1 Always
2 Working on something importan
3 Every now and then
4 Nevermographic variables (such as gender and nationality) between
groups, the summary shows that an even spread of question re-
sponse was achieved. We conclude that the randomisation of
groups based on demographic and other independent variables
have been effective since the results of each group are closely
aligned with one another as well as the group as a whole.All Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
e 1: 81% 1: 87% 1: 71% 1: 85%
2: 14% 2: 13% 2: 14% 2: 15%
3: 5% 3: 14%
45% male 67% male 29% male 38% male
1: 31%
2: 19% 1: 14% 1: 23%
3:2% 1: 53% 2: 14% 2: 23%
4: 5% 2: 20% 4: 7% 3: 8%
5: 24% 5: 20% 5: 36% 4: 8%
6: 10% 8: 7% 6: 7% 5: 15%
7: 5% 7: 14% 6: 23%
8: 5% 8: 7%
2.10 2.12 2.08 2.10
(1.11) (1.11) (1.13) (1.14)
2.21 2.22 2.32 2.28
(1.26) (1.28) (1.28) (1.26)
2.02 2.00 2.00 2.08
(.86) (.86) (.86) (.85)
2.29 2.27 2.32 2.30
(.76) (.77) (.76) (.78)
4.55 4.56 4.55 4.58
(1.18) (1.19) (1.23) (1.18)
3.57 3.51 3.61 3.68
(2.09) (2.09) (2.13) (2.09)
2.48 2.44 2.47 2.53
(.98) (.96) (.99) (.97)
2.05 2.05 2.09 2.08
(.96) (.97) (1.00) (.97)
1.10 1.10 1.08 1.10
(.30) (.30) (.27) (.30)
1.17 1.15 1.16 1.18
(.37) (.35) (.36) (.38)
3.98 4.02 4.08 3.95
(1.06) (1.02) (1.04) (1.07)
2.31 2.32 2.32 2.30
t
(1.03) (1.05) (1.05) (1.05)
Table C1 (continued )
Variable Coding All Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Demographic information
V20: Important to save energy 1 Yes 2 No 1.10 1.10 1.11 1.10
(.43) (.43) (.45) (.44)
V22: Usage pattern 1 Morning 2 Afternoon 3.50 3.51 3.50 3.50
3 Evening 4 Night
5 I do not know (.82) (.83) (.82) (.84)
Experimental check
V23: Resident familiarity 1 None 2 Less than 5 3.60 3.56 3.53 3.60
3 5 – 10 4 11–20
5 20þ (1.16) (1.15) (1.19) (1.18)
V24: Resident interaction 1 None 2 Less than 5 2.57 2.56 2.61 2.60
3 5 – 10 4 11–20
5 20þ (1.00) (1.01) (1.04) (1.02)
Notes: % indicates the split between categories. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means. Sample size (N): All ¼42; Group 1¼15; Group 2¼14; Group 3¼13
Table C2
Typical energy usage for household appliances. (Source: Adapted from US DoE, 2012; Warwickshire Switch It Off Campaign, n.d.)
Appliance Maximum power (W) Typical standby (W)
Microwave oven 750–1100 2
Refrigerator 90–120 n/a
Laptop 50 –
Kettle 900–1200 –
Hair dryer / straightener 1200–1875 –
Toaster 800–1400 –
Electric heater 750–1500 400
Monitor 150 30
Iron 1000–1800 n/a
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see: Table D1.
see: Figs. D1 and D2.Table D1
Electricity and heat energy consumption.
Electricity consumption pre treatment in kWh Heat energy consumption pre treatment in kWh
Average Average growth Average Average growth
Treatment groups Control 18.198 0.037 6.310 0.123
All Treated 17.329 0.009 10.350 0.300
Information 17.167 0.022 12.200* 0.230
Competition 17.492 0.004 8.500** 0.387
Position relative to peers Marginal 23.958 0.009 16.323 0.139
Non Marginal 15.269*** 0.011 6.342*** 0.330
Notes: *¼signiﬁcant at 10%, **¼signiﬁcant at 5%, ***¼signiﬁcant at 1%.
Fig. D1. Marginal vs Non Marginal group – Top 10 threshold.
Notes: As Fig. 4 but marginal group only includes students that are ranked 10 or lower in week 6 (rather than ranked 5 or lower).
Fig. D2. Marginal vs Non Marginal group – Bottom 25 threshold.
Notes: As Fig. 4 but marginal group excludes bottom 25 (rather than bottom 20).
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